DISCLAIMER: This article contains general legal information. It is not legal advice. All legal information in this article is true as of the time of writing. However, the law may change over time. To obtain legal advice about a specific legal issue that may impact your personal situation, speak to a licensed attorney. If we mention specific groups or individuals, we don’t do so to mock, shame, or disavow them. We sympathize with all political prisoners who share our worldview.
This article is part of a series that the American Futurist is releasing on legal topics that impact revolutionaries. A big problem revolutionaries face is getting into legal trouble because they don’t know the law. This project aims to alleviate this problem.
To communicate effective ways to fight ZOG, it is essential to understand speech laws. This knowledge also helps to cut through the lies of grifters, movementarians, and other cowards that baselessly bad-jacket anyone who is more radical than them. Building off of our previous article, “How is this site legal?” this article will explain the categories of illegal speech and illustrate how speech laws are applied in practice. We also included a concise summary of legal v. illegal speech at the end of this article.
I. The First Amendment
The First Amendment states that, “Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of speech”1 The Supreme Court has interpreted this clause to protect against the regulation of “protected” speech while giving greater leniency to regulate “unprotected” speech.2 This applies to spoken word as well as online speech.3 Political and ideological speech are generally First Amendment protected.4 However, speech may be punishable by law if it is considered incitement or a true threat.5 These are the two most relevant categories of unprotected speech for the purposes of this article.
a. Incitement
This is the standard that we’ve all likely heard of. According to the Supreme Court, speech constitutes incitement if it is “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”6 In plain English, this means that the speech must be likely to immediately produce illegal activity.7 Speech is much more likely to be deemed incitement if illegal activity actually occurs after it is spoken.8
Case law has further clarified that speech is not incitement just because someone “may take offense to particular expression.”9 Speech directed at a general crowd of people that advocates illegal action at some indefinite future time is not incitement.10 Impassioned rhetoric that’s suggestive of violence is not incitement.11 Speech “encouraging,” “promoting,” “urging,” and “involving” the mere advocacy of violence is also not incitement.12 Additionally, “the abstract teaching of the moral propriety…of a resort to violence” is not incitement. 13
Overall, to convict someone of incitement, the pigs have a very high bar to meet. Practically speaking, incitement almost never occurs in online speech. This is because online content might inspire violence at some indefinite time in the future, but it’s unlikely to cause immediate violence.14 Incitement occurs most often during real life events like political protests. Thus, people most often get in trouble for online speech by communicating true threats, which is discussed below.
i. Incitement: Case Studies • Brandenburg v. Ohio: This Supreme Court case created the incitement standard. During a private Klan rally, a Klansmen said, “We’re not a revengent organization, but if our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it’s possible that there might have to be some revengeance taken.”15 He also made generalized threats against niggers, kikes, and the U.S. government in the same speech. ◦ NOT INCITEMENT ◦ Generalized threats of violence at some indefinite time in the future are not incitement. ◦ The abstract teaching of the moral necessity of violence is not incitement. • Hess v. Indiana: During an anti-war protest, a protester shouted at a crowd, “We’ll take the fucking street later!” ◦ NOT INCITEMENT ◦ Threatening speech directed at a general crowd of people rather than any person or group of persons is not incitement. ◦ Advocating illegality at an indefinite future time isn’t incitement. • NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware: The NAACP organized a boycott of White businesses. During the protest, the nigger NAACP Field Secretary gave a public speech where he said that if anyone disobeyed the boycott, “we’re gonna break your damn neck.” ◦ NOT INCITEMENT ◦ Impassioned rhetoric that’s suggestive of violence is not incitement. ◦ The fact that no violence occurred after this speech influenced the court’s determination that this was not incitement. • TX v. Johnson: Defendant burned an American flag at a political protest. ◦ NOT INCITEMENT: ◦ Speech is not incitement just because someone might be offended by it. ◦ The fact that no violence occurred after the flag was burned influenced the court’s determination that this was not incitement. • United States v. Fullmer: Members of an animal rights group hosted “virtual sit ins” on their website for group members to conduct “electronic civil disobedience” against corporations that engaged in animal testing.16 ◦ Electronic civil disobedience tactics included overwhelming the websites, e-mail servers, and telephone service of a targeted company as well as using “black faxes,” or repeatedly faxing a black piece of paper to the same fax machine to exhaust the toner or ink supply. ◦ Website administrators told the group to participate in electronic civil disobedience at specific times and provided links with instructions to carry out these tactics. ◦ INCITEMENT (a rare case of online speech constituting incitement) ◦ Illegal activity occurred immediately after website administrators posted information online (violated the Animal Enterprise Protection Act – 18 U.S.C. § 43). • Rise Above Movement (RAM) cases: members of the nationalist athletics group RAM were charged with violating the Anti-Riot Act for defending themselves against Antifa attacks at numerous rallies in California. 17 The Anti-Riot Act criminalizes the “use of any facility of interstate or foreign commerce…with intent—to incite a riot…”18 ◦ As of the time of writing, this case is still being litigated in court. However, the pigs have secured an indictment against RAM members for incitement to riot in violation of the Anti-Riot Act.19 ◦ Violent altercations occurred between RAM members and Antifa at protests. This helped to secure indictments against RAM members. ◦ RAM members used social media, text messages, phone calls, and credit cards, all of which are “facilities of interstate commerce,” to coordinate attendance at these protests.
In 2019, the 9th Circuit federal court of appeals dismissed the initial indictment against Rob Rundo and other RAM members because the Anti-Riot Act was declared unconstitutional. However, it is important to understand why it was declared unconstitutional and why RAM is being re-indicted. The Anti-Riot Act was passed in 1968 while Brandenberg v. Ohio, the Supreme Court case that established the incitement standard, was decided in 1969. Before Brandenberg, ZOG was allowed to criminalize more speech besides incitement. However, Brandenberg narrowed the types of speech that are considered illegal, allowing for greater freedom of speech. Because the Anti-Riot Act was passed before Brandenberg, its original text criminalized more speech besides incitement. The original text made it illegal “(1) to incite a riot; or (2) to organize, promote, encourage, participate in, or carry on a riot…” At trial, the 9th Circuit determined this was unconstitutional because it punished more speech than is constitutionally allowed. More specifically, it is legal under Brandenberg to “organize,” “promote,” and “encourage” a riot.20 Therefore, the indictment was dismissed and Rundo was released. However, the court applied severability doctrine, which states that if portions of a statute are unconstitutional, the illegal parts are struck down while the remainder is still legal and can be applied. So, the new text makes it illegal “(1) to incite a riot; or (2) to participate in, or carry on a riot…” RAM is being re-indicted under the updated statute.
To any impartial observer, it is obvious that these new charges against RAM are bullshit. To the seething of Antifa, the pigs, and liberal journalists, even U.S. District Judge Cormac Carney admitted that the system is selectively prosecuting RAM while turning a blind eye to Antifa rioters and BLM niggers.21 Nevertheless, situations like this are why we don’t encourage going to public protests. Not only do they not achieve anything, but when shit happens, the system will harass you and potentially destroy your life, like what happened to the RAM guys. We wish Rundo and the rest of RAM good luck, but we know the system isn’t in our favor.
b. True Threats & 18 U.S.C. § 875(c)
True threats are another category of illegal speech. Most people who are arrested for online speech are arrested for true threats, not for incitement. True threats occur when the speaker communicates “a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”22 Statements communicated directly to a target are more likely to be true threats than those communicated to a broad audience.23 True threats do not include statements made in jest or political hyperbole.24 A true threat does not require that the speaker intend to carry it out or that they have the capacity to carry it out.25 Communications can still be considered true threats even if the threat does not reach its intended target or even if almost no one observes with the threat.26 To convict someone for making a true threat, law enforcement must prove the speaker was reckless, meaning they consciously disregarded a substantial risk that the communication would be viewed as threatening violence.27
Those who communicate true threats are commonly charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), which criminalizes transmitting, “in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of another.”28 For an 875(c) conviction, the speech in question must be a true threat as described above.29 Although 875(c) criminalizes threats in “interstate commerce,” the speech doesn’t have to be about business or commercial matters. It only requires that the threat be communicated through a channel or instrumentality of interstate commerce, such as the mail system, a phone call, text message, or internet communication.30 This “interstate commerce” language is just a jurisdictional hook that gives federal law enforcement authority over the case.31 Furthermore, the threat does not actually have to cross state lines. If the speaker and recipient live in the same state but the speaker uses a channel or instrumentality of interstate commerce, like the internet, to communicate the threat, it can still be punished under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).32
In short, threats against specific individuals are illegal, but generalized threats are legal. The pigs admits this themselves. According to former DHS glownigger Daryl Johnson, “Saying ‘I’m going to kill Jews,’ isn’t enough – someone can report that, but law enforcement isn’t going to investigate…It has to be coupled with some sort of specific detail.”33
i. True Threats: Case Studies • Commonwealth v. Knox: Defendant made a song containing threats against pigs and posted it on YouTube. 34 ◦ TRUE THREAT ◦ The song mentioned the pigs by name, described the specific ways he would kill them, and the music video included the pigs’ pictures. • United States v. Carmichael: Pigs arrested defendant on money-laundering and drug dealing charges with evidence provided by informants. 35 ◦ Defendant made a website where he wrote “WANTED” in large, red letters, and wrote “Information on these Informants and Agents,” followed by 8 pictures of police officers and informants. ◦ The website directed users to contact defendant’s attorneys. It also included the following disclaimer: “This website, or any posters and advertisements concerning the Carmichael Case, is definitely not an attempt to intimidate or harass any informants or agents but is simply an attempt to seek information.” ◦ NOT A TRUE THREAT ◦ The posters contained no threatening language. Although the court considered the history of violence against informants and that some individuals featured on the website were scared, this wasn’t enough for the court to consider this a true threat. • Planned parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists: Anti-abortion activists made posters and websites featuring well known abortion doctors and abortion supporters. 36 ◦ Posters stated “GUILTY OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY” and featured names, pictures, and home addresses of 13 abortion doctors. ◦ The website featured the names and addresses of abortion supporters along with a legend on their status: “Black font (working); Grayed-out Name (wounded); Strike-through (fatality).” The names of three recently murdered abortion doctors were updated as struck through. ◦ TRUE THREAT ◦ Although the posters didn’t have threatening language, they were true threats because three recently murdered abortion doctors had similar “WANTED” posters published about them before their deaths. Because defendants knew of this pattern and published the posters and website anyways, the court found them guilty of making true threats. Defendants were guilty despite being neither responsible for the earlier wanted posters nor the earlier killings of the abortion doctors. • In June 2023, a Kansas man was arrested for communicating threats in interstate commerce (18 U.S.C. § 875(c)) against a fag pride event.37 ◦ Under a Facebook post for the event, he commented he would, “make shrapnel pressure cooker bombs for this event.” ◦ TRUE THREAT ◦ He threatened a specific group of people at a specific event. • In March 2023, a member of Feuerkrieg Division (FKD) was arrested for communicating threats (18 U.S.C. § 875(c)) to a journalist.38 ◦ He sent a meme to the journalist through their Twitter DM. The meme showed a photo of the journalist with a gun pointed at his head with the messages “race traitor,” “journalist fuck off,” “you have been warned” with the journalist’s name and place of employment. ◦ TRUE THREAT ◦ He made threats against a specific person sent to his social media account.39 • In July 2021, a West Virginia man was charged with interstate communication of threats (18 U.S.C. § 875(c)) and threatening a Federal Official (18 U.S.C. § 115(b)(4)) for threatening Rachel Levine, the kike tranny U.S. Assistant Secretary of Health.40 ◦ He sent threatening emails to Levine’s email address. The contents of these emails included: “Hey Richard “Dick” Levine, Hope you and every cocksucking piece of diseased Talmudic dog shit at your mikvah is rounded up and thrown into a garbage incinerator.” ◦ Although the defendant used an anonymous Protonmail account to send the threatening emails, his identity was compromised when he sent an email from the Protonmail account to his personal email address that included his real name. This email included the username and password to the anonymous Protonmail account. Feds easily obtained this evidence with a warrant. ◦ TRUE THREAT ◦ He made threats against a specific person by sending it to their email address. • Atomwaffen Division (AWD): In 2020, AWD members were jailed after FBI infiltrators urged them to mail threatening posters to the houses of journalists and ADL employees in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).41 ◦ The posters depicted hooded figures throwing Molotov cocktails at houses along with the statements, “You have been visited by your local Nazis,” and “Death to Pigs.” ◦ TRUE THREAT ◦ They threatened specific people by mailing the posters to their targets’ homes. II. Communicating About Violence Online Legally
ILLEGAL SPEECH:
• Speech that is immediately followed by illegal activity (incitement).
• Making threats directed to a SPECIFIC person or place (true threat).
◦ This includes sending threats to someone’s home address,42 social media DM,43 email address,44 and threatening them by name on a social media platform like Facebook45 or 4Chan.46
◦ It doesn’t matter if the speaker intended to carry out the threat or if the speaker had the capacity to carry out the threat.47
◦ It doesn’t matter if the threat reaches its intended target or if almost no one interacted with the threat.48
LEGAL SPEECH:
• Generalized threats (Not directed at specific people)49
• Speech that encourages, promotes, urges, and involves advocating for violence.50
• Advocating illegal action, such as violence, at some indefinite future time.51
• Impassioned rhetoric that’s suggestive of violence.52
• The abstract teaching of the moral necessity of a resort to violence.53
• Hypothetical or fictional accounts of violence.54
• Political or ideological hyperbole (even if it implies violence against specific people or places).55
If for whatever reason, the FBI wants to ask you questions about things you said online, don’t talk to them. Say “I assert my right to remain silent. I assert my right to an attorney. I have nothing to say.” If they had enough evidence to arrest you, they would have done so already. They are only talking to you because they want to intimidate you and they want to trick you into giving them an incriminating statement. Don’t talk to pigs.
Hail Victory!
American Futurist Staff
FOOTNOTES:
1 U.S. CONST. amend. I
2 See https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11072
3 See In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir.2011)
4 See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)
5 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969), Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969)
6 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447
7 See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 106-07 (1973)
8 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 408-409 (1989); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982)
9 See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 408-409
10 See Hess, 414 U.S. at 106-07
11 See Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 928
12 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449; United States v. Miselis, 972 F.3d 518, 525-26 (4th Cir. 2020)
13 See Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-298 (1961)
14 See United States v. Carmichael, 326 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1287
15 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447
16 See United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 155-56 (3d Cir. 2009)
17 See United States v. Rundo, 990 F.3d 709 (9th Cir. 2021), Miselis, 972 F.3d at 518
18 18 U.S.C. § 2101
19 See https://archive.is/feja6
20 See Rundo, 990 F.3d at 709
21 See https://archive.ph/uPfq4
22 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003)
23 See United States v. Bellrichard, 994 F.2d 1318, 1321 (8th Cir. 1993); Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v.
Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1099 (9th Cir. 2002)
24 See Watts, 394 U.S. at 708
25 See Black, 538 U.S. at 360; United States v. Parr, 545 F.3d 491, 498 (7th Cir. 2008)
26 See United States v. Dutcher, 851 F.3d 757, 762
27 See Counterman v. Colorado, 143 S. Ct. 2106, 2109
28 18 U.S.C. § 875(c)
29 See United States v. Stewart, 411 F.3d 825
30 See United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 11878 (2d Cir.)
31 See https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11971
32 See United States v. Kammersell, 196 F.3d 1137, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 29818 (10th Cir. 1999)
33 See https://archive.ph/K2Rg5
34 See Commonwealth v. Knox, 647 Pa. 593, 614
35 See Carmichael, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 1272
36 See Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1065
37 See https://archive.ph/1v9v8
38 See https://archive.ph/Jo4dP
39 See https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/23904100/complaint-against-craig-deleeuw-robertson.pdf
40 See https://archive.ph/0htLC
41 See United States v. Cole, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 8757
42 See Id.
43 See https://archive.ph/Jo4dP
44 See https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/23904100/complaint-against-craig-deleeuw-robertson.pdf
45 See https://archive.ph/4OnOW
46 See https://archive.ph/RxYYM
47 See Black, 538 U.S. at 360; Parr, 545 F.3d at 498
48 See Dutcher, 851 F.3d at 762
49 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447
50 See Miselis, 972 F.3d at 525-26
51 See Hess, 414 U.S. at 106-07
52 See Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 928
53 See Noto, 367 U.S. at 297-298
54 See Id.
55 See Watts, 394 U.S. at 708